| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The API function `ssh_get_hexa()` is vulnerable, when 0-lenght
input is provided to this function. This function is used internally
in `ssh_get_fingerprint_hash()` and `ssh_print_hexa()` (deprecated),
which is vulnerable to the same input (length is provided by the
calling application).
The function is also used internally in the gssapi code for logging
the OIDs received by the server during GSSAPI authentication. This
could be triggered remotely, when the server allows GSSAPI authentication
and logging verbosity is set at least to SSH_LOG_PACKET (3). This
could cause self-DoS of the per-connection daemon process. |
| RustCrypto: Signatures offers support for digital signatures, which provide authentication of data using public-key cryptography. Prior to version 0.1.0-rc.2, a timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.0-rc.2. |
| Some end of service NETGEAR products provide "TelnetEnable" functionality, which allows a magic packet to activate telnet service on the box. |
| uTLS is a fork of crypto/tls, created to customize ClientHello for fingerprinting resistance while still using it for the handshake. Versions 1.6.0 through 1.8.0 contain a fingerprint mismatch with Chrome when using GREASE ECH, related to cipher suite selection. When Chrome selects the preferred cipher suite in the outer ClientHello and for ECH, it does so consistently based on hardware support—for example, if it prefers AES for the outer cipher suite, it also uses AES for ECH. However, the Chrome parrot in uTLS hardcodes AES preference for outer cipher suites but selects the ECH cipher suite randomly between AES and ChaCha20. This creates a 50% chance of selecting ChaCha20 for ECH while using AES for the outer cipher suite, a combination impossible in Chrome. This issue only affects GREASE ECH; in real ECH, Chrome selects the first valid cipher suite when AES is preferred, which uTLS handles correctly. This issue has been fixed in version 1.8.1. |
| In products of the MSE6 product-family by Festo a remote authenticated, low privileged attacker could use functions of undocumented test mode which could lead to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0075, a heap-based buffer underflow exists in Vim's Emacs-style tags file parsing logic. When processing a malformed tags file where a delimiter appears at the start of a line, Vim attempts to read memory immediately preceding the allocated buffer. Version 9.2.0075 fixes the issue. |
| CoreDNS is a DNS server that chains plugins. Prior to version 1.14.2, a denial of service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS's loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process. This issue has been patched in version 1.14.2. |
| A flaw was found in the GLib Base64 encoding routine when processing very large input data. Due to incorrect use of integer types during length calculation, the library may miscalculate buffer boundaries. This can cause memory writes outside the allocated buffer. Applications that process untrusted or extremely large Base64 input using GLib may crash or behave unpredictably. |
| A flaw was found in Glib's content type parsing logic. This buffer underflow vulnerability occurs because the length of a header line is stored in a signed integer, which can lead to integer wraparound for very large inputs. This results in pointer underflow and out-of-bounds memory access. Exploitation requires a local user to install or process a specially crafted treemagic file, which can lead to local denial of service or application instability. |
| Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.8.0b2 and prior, the `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations. |
| Improper Protection Against Voltage and Clock Glitches in FPGA devices, could allow an attacker with physical access to undervolt the platform resulting in a loss of confidentiality. |
| KV STUDIO versions 12.23 and prior contain a buffer underflow vulnerability. If the product uses a specially crafted file, arbitrary code may be executed on the affected product. |
| A vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root-level privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid administrative credentials.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of commands that are supplied by the user. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to a device and submitting crafted input for specific commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands on the underlying operating system as root. |
| Improper Hardware reset flow logic in the GPU GFX Hardware IP block could allow a privileged attacker in a guest virtual machine to control reset operation potentially causing host or GPU crash or reset resulting in denial of service. |
| Improper finite state machines (FSMs) in hardware logic in some Intel(R) Processors may allow an privileged user to potentially enable a denial of service via local access. |
| A voltage glitch during the startup of EEFC NVM controllers on Microchip SAM E70/S70/V70/V71, SAM G55, SAM 4C/4S/4N/4E, and SAM 3S/3N/3U microcontrollers allows access to the memory bus via the debug interface even if the security bit is set. |
| Inclusion of undocumented features or chicken bits issue exists in UD-LT1 firmware Ver.2.1.8 and earlier and UD-LT1/EX firmware Ver.2.1.8 and earlier. A remote attacker may disable the firewall function of the affected products. As a result, an arbitrary OS command may be executed and/or configuration settings of the device may be altered. |
| Plonky2 is a SNARK implementation based on techniques from PLONK and FRI. Lookup tables, whose length is not divisible by 26 = floor(num_routed_wires / 3) always include the 0 -> 0 input-output pair. Thus a malicious prover can always prove that f(0) = 0 for any lookup table f (unless its length happens to be divisible by 26). The cause of problem is that the LookupTableGate-s are padded with zeros. A workaround from the user side is to extend the table (by repeating some entries) so that its length becomes divisible by 26. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1. |
| The anti-theft protection mechanism can be bypassed by attackers due to weak response generation algorithms for the head unit. It is possible to reveal all 32 corresponding responses by sniffing CAN traffic or by pre-calculating the values, which allow to bypass the protection.
First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020. |
| Dormakaba Saflok System 6000 contains a predictable key generation algorithm that allows attackers to derive card access keys from a 32-bit unique identifier. Attackers can exploit the deterministic key generation process by calculating valid access keys using a simple mathematical transformation of the card's unique identifier. |
