| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In ImageMagick 7.0.7-16 Q16, a vulnerability was found in the function ReadOnePNGImage in coders/png.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (ReadOneMNGImage large loop) via a crafted mng image file. |
| A denial of service vulnerability in the Android media framework (libstagefright). Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62673179. |
| The ReadRLEImage function in coders\rle.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a large loop vulnerability via a crafted rle file that triggers a huge number_pixels value. |
| In Wireshark 2.0.0 to 2.0.13, the GPRS LLC dissector could go into a large loop. This was addressed in epan/dissectors/packet-gprs-llc.c by using a different integer data type. |
| The play_midi function in playmidi.c in TiMidity++ 2.14.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (large loop and CPU consumption) via a crafted mid file. NOTE: CPU consumption might be relevant when using the --background option. |
| In libavformat/rmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in ivr_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted IVR file, which claims a large "len" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the first type==4 loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. |
| In libavformat/rl2.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in rl2_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted RL2 file, which claims a large "frame_count" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loops (for offset and size tables) would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside these loops. |
| In FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_read_marker() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large "name_len" or "count" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loops over the name and markers would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside these loops. |
| In FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in cine_read_header() due to lack of an EOF check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted CINE file, which claims a large "duration" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the image-offset parsing loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. |
| In libavformat/mxfdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3 -> 2.4, a DoS in mxf_read_index_entry_array() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted MXF file, which claims a large "nb_index_entries" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. Moreover, this big loop can be invoked multiple times if there is more than one applicable data segment in the crafted MXF file. |
| In libavformat/nsvdec.c in FFmpeg 2.4 and 3.3.3, a DoS in nsv_parse_NSVf_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted NSV file, which claims a large "table_entries_used" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over 'table_entries_used' would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. |
| In coders/ps.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSImage() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large "extent" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over "length" would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. |
| In coders/psd.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSDLayersInternal() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large "length" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over "length" would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. |
| The pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr function in hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) by leveraging failure to limit process IO loop to the ring size. |
| A maliciously-crafted image can cause excessive CPU consumption in decoding. A tiled image with a height of 0 and a very large width can cause excessive CPU consumption, despite the image size (width * height) appearing to be zero. |
| A carefully crafted PDF file can trigger an infinite loop while loading the file. This issue affects Apache PDFBox version 2.0.22 and prior 2.0.x versions. |
| Excessive Iteration vulnerability in Apache Software Foundation Apache Sling Resource Merger.This issue affects Apache Sling Resource Merger: from 1.2.0 before 1.4.2.
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| In Eclipse Parsson before versions 1.1.4 and 1.0.5, Parsing JSON from untrusted sources can lead malicious actors to exploit the fact that the built-in support for parsing numbers with large scale in Java has a number of edge cases where the input text of a number can lead to much larger processing time than one would expect.
To mitigate the risk, parsson put in place a size limit for the numbers as well as their scale.
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| In Math/BinaryField.php in phpseclib 3 before 3.0.34, excessively large degrees can lead to a denial of service. |
| gRPC contains a vulnerability that allows hpack table accounting errors could lead to unwanted disconnects between clients and servers in exceptional cases/ Three vectors were found that allow the following DOS attacks:
- Unbounded memory buffering in the HPACK parser
- Unbounded CPU consumption in the HPACK parser
The unbounded CPU consumption is down to a copy that occurred per-input-block in the parser, and because that could be unbounded due to the memory copy bug we end up with an O(n^2) parsing loop, with n selected by the client.
The unbounded memory buffering bugs:
- The header size limit check was behind the string reading code, so we needed to first buffer up to a 4 gigabyte string before rejecting it as longer than 8 or 16kb.
- HPACK varints have an encoding quirk whereby an infinite number of 0’s can be added at the start of an integer. gRPC’s hpack parser needed to read all of them before concluding a parse.
- gRPC’s metadata overflow check was performed per frame, so that the following sequence of frames could cause infinite buffering: HEADERS: containing a: 1 CONTINUATION: containing a: 2 CONTINUATION: containing a: 3 etc… |
