| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue was discovered in libexpat before 2.6.3. xmlparse.c does not reject a negative length for XML_ParseBuffer. |
| libxml2 before 2.12.10 and 2.13.x before 2.13.6 has a use-after-free in xmlSchemaIDCFillNodeTables and xmlSchemaBubbleIDCNodeTables in xmlschemas.c. To exploit this, a crafted XML document must be validated against an XML schema with certain identity constraints, or a crafted XML schema must be used. |
| In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.21.3, an attacker can cause invalid memory reads during GSS message token handling by sending message tokens with invalid length fields. |
| xmlXIncludeAddNode in xinclude.c in libxml2 before 2.11.0 has a use-after-free. |
| nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure
The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients. The
flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. |
| When an application tells libcurl it wants to allow HTTP/2 server push, and the amount of received headers for the push surpasses the maximum allowed limit (1000), libcurl aborts the server push. When aborting, libcurl inadvertently does not free all the previously allocated headers and instead leaks the memory. Further, this error condition fails silently and is therefore not easily detected by an application. |
| nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache
If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted
by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data
may result in a stack-based buffer overflow. This flaw was introduced
in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. |
| nscd: Null pointer crashes after notfound response
If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found
netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null
pointer dereference. This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the
cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. |
| nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings
The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory
when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer.
The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary. |
| Issue summary: Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS
clients checking server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory
address resulting in abnormal termination of the application process.
Impact summary: Abnormal termination of an application can a cause a denial of
service.
Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS clients checking
server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory address when
comparing the expected name with an `otherName` subject alternative name of an
X.509 certificate. This may result in an exception that terminates the
application program.
Note that basic certificate chain validation (signatures, dates, ...) is not
affected, the denial of service can occur only when the application also
specifies an expected DNS name, Email address or IP address.
TLS servers rarely solicit client certificates, and even when they do, they
generally don't perform a name check against a reference identifier (expected
identity), but rather extract the presented identity after checking the
certificate chain. So TLS servers are generally not affected and the severity
of the issue is Moderate.
The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. |
| A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. |
| A denial of service is possible from excessive resource consumption in net/http and mime/multipart. Multipart form parsing with mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm can consume largely unlimited amounts of memory and disk files. This also affects form parsing in the net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue, ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue. ReadForm takes a maxMemory parameter, and is documented as storing "up to maxMemory bytes +10MB (reserved for non-file parts) in memory". File parts which cannot be stored in memory are stored on disk in temporary files. The unconfigurable 10MB reserved for non-file parts is excessively large and can potentially open a denial of service vector on its own. However, ReadForm did not properly account for all memory consumed by a parsed form, such as map entry overhead, part names, and MIME headers, permitting a maliciously crafted form to consume well over 10MB. In addition, ReadForm contained no limit on the number of disk files created, permitting a relatively small request body to create a large number of disk temporary files. With fix, ReadForm now properly accounts for various forms of memory overhead, and should now stay within its documented limit of 10MB + maxMemory bytes of memory consumption. Users should still be aware that this limit is high and may still be hazardous. In addition, ReadForm now creates at most one on-disk temporary file, combining multiple form parts into a single temporary file. The mime/multipart.File interface type's documentation states, "If stored on disk, the File's underlying concrete type will be an *os.File.". This is no longer the case when a form contains more than one file part, due to this coalescing of parts into a single file. The previous behavior of using distinct files for each form part may be reenabled with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartfiles=distinct. Users should be aware that multipart.ReadForm and the http.Request methods that call it do not limit the amount of disk consumed by temporary files. Callers can limit the size of form data with http.MaxBytesReader. |
| Large handshake records may cause panics in crypto/tls. Both clients and servers may send large TLS handshake records which cause servers and clients, respectively, to panic when attempting to construct responses. This affects all TLS 1.3 clients, TLS 1.2 clients which explicitly enable session resumption (by setting Config.ClientSessionCache to a non-nil value), and TLS 1.3 servers which request client certificates (by setting Config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert). |
| Before Go 1.20, the RSA based TLS key exchanges used the math/big library, which is not constant time. RSA blinding was applied to prevent timing attacks, but analysis shows this may not have been fully effective. In particular it appears as if the removal of PKCS#1 padding may leak timing information, which in turn could be used to recover session key bits. In Go 1.20, the crypto/tls library switched to a fully constant time RSA implementation, which we do not believe exhibits any timing side channels. |
| A malicious HTTP sender can use chunk extensions to cause a receiver reading from a request or response body to read many more bytes from the network than are in the body. A malicious HTTP client can further exploit this to cause a server to automatically read a large amount of data (up to about 1GiB) when a handler fails to read the entire body of a request. Chunk extensions are a little-used HTTP feature which permit including additional metadata in a request or response body sent using the chunked encoding. The net/http chunked encoding reader discards this metadata. A sender can exploit this by inserting a large metadata segment with each byte transferred. The chunk reader now produces an error if the ratio of real body to encoded bytes grows too small. |
| A malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit (MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function. |
| QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size. |
| Processing an incomplete post-handshake message for a QUIC connection can cause a panic. |
| The html/template package does not apply the proper rules for handling occurrences of "<script", "<!--", and "</script" within JS literals in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly consider script contexts to be terminated early, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This could be leveraged to perform an XSS attack. |
| The html/template package does not properly handle HTML-like "" comment tokens, nor hashbang "#!" comment tokens, in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly interpret the contents of <script> contexts, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This may be leveraged to perform an XSS attack. |
