| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache Commons.
A special BeanIntrospector class was added in version 1.9.2. This can be used to stop attackers from using the declared class property of Java enum objects to get access to the classloader. However this protection was not enabled by default. PropertyUtilsBean (and consequently BeanUtilsBean) now disallows declared class level property access by default.
Releases 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 address a potential security issue when accessing enum properties in an uncontrolled way. If an application using Commons BeanUtils passes property paths from an external source directly to the getProperty() method of PropertyUtilsBean, an attacker can access the enum’s class loader via the “declaredClass” property available on all Java “enum” objects. Accessing the enum’s “declaredClass” allows remote attackers to access the ClassLoader and execute arbitrary code. The same issue exists with PropertyUtilsBean.getNestedProperty().
Starting in versions 1.11.0 and 2.0.0-M2 a special BeanIntrospector suppresses the “declaredClass” property. Note that this new BeanIntrospector is enabled by default, but you can disable it to regain the old behavior; see section 2.5 of the user's guide and the unit tests.
This issue affects Apache Commons BeanUtils 1.x before 1.11.0, and 2.x before 2.0.0-M2.Users of the artifact commons-beanutils:commons-beanutils
1.x are recommended to upgrade to version 1.11.0, which fixes the issue.
Users of the artifact org.apache.commons:commons-beanutils2
2.x are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0-M2, which fixes the issue. |
| The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023. |
| A vulnerability was found in systemd-resolved. This issue may allow systemd-resolved to accept records of DNSSEC-signed domains even when they have no signature, allowing man-in-the-middles (or the upstream DNS resolver) to manipulate records. |
| pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. From 42.7.4 and until 42.7.7, when the PostgreSQL JDBC driver is configured with channel binding set to required (default value is prefer), the driver would incorrectly allow connections to proceed with authentication methods that do not support channel binding (such as password, MD5, GSS, or SSPI authentication). This could allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to intercept connections that users believed were protected by channel binding requirements. This vulnerability is fixed in 42.7.7. |
| DOMPurify is a DOM-only, super-fast, uber-tolerant XSS sanitizer for HTML, MathML and SVG. It has been discovered that malicious HTML using special nesting techniques can bypass the depth checking added to DOMPurify in recent releases. It was also possible to use Prototype Pollution to weaken the depth check. This renders dompurify unable to avoid cross site scripting (XSS) attacks. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.5.4 and 3.1.3 of DOMPurify. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.108.Final. |
| A flaw was found in hibernate-validator's 'isValid' method in the org.hibernate.validator.internal.constraintvalidators.hv.SafeHtmlValidator class, which can be bypassed by omitting the tag ending in a less-than character. Browsers may render an invalid html, allowing HTML injection or Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) attacks. |
| A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests. |
| An attacker can pass a malicious malformed token which causes unexpected memory to be consumed during parsing. |
| Vert.x-Web is a set of building blocks for building web applications in the java programming language. When running vertx web applications that serve files using `StaticHandler` on Windows Operating Systems and Windows File Systems, if the mount point is a wildcard (`*`) then an attacker can exfiltrate any class path resource. When computing the relative path to locate the resource, in case of wildcards, the code: `return "/" + rest;` from `Utils.java` returns the user input (without validation) as the segment to lookup. Even though checks are performed to avoid escaping the sandbox, given that the input was not sanitized `\` are not properly handled and an attacker can build a path that is valid within the classpath. This issue only affects users deploying in windows environments and upgrading is the advised remediation path. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| A denial of service is possible from excessive resource consumption in net/http and mime/multipart. Multipart form parsing with mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm can consume largely unlimited amounts of memory and disk files. This also affects form parsing in the net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue, ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue. ReadForm takes a maxMemory parameter, and is documented as storing "up to maxMemory bytes +10MB (reserved for non-file parts) in memory". File parts which cannot be stored in memory are stored on disk in temporary files. The unconfigurable 10MB reserved for non-file parts is excessively large and can potentially open a denial of service vector on its own. However, ReadForm did not properly account for all memory consumed by a parsed form, such as map entry overhead, part names, and MIME headers, permitting a maliciously crafted form to consume well over 10MB. In addition, ReadForm contained no limit on the number of disk files created, permitting a relatively small request body to create a large number of disk temporary files. With fix, ReadForm now properly accounts for various forms of memory overhead, and should now stay within its documented limit of 10MB + maxMemory bytes of memory consumption. Users should still be aware that this limit is high and may still be hazardous. In addition, ReadForm now creates at most one on-disk temporary file, combining multiple form parts into a single temporary file. The mime/multipart.File interface type's documentation states, "If stored on disk, the File's underlying concrete type will be an *os.File.". This is no longer the case when a form contains more than one file part, due to this coalescing of parts into a single file. The previous behavior of using distinct files for each form part may be reenabled with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipartfiles=distinct. Users should be aware that multipart.ReadForm and the http.Request methods that call it do not limit the amount of disk consumed by temporary files. Callers can limit the size of form data with http.MaxBytesReader. |
| Large handshake records may cause panics in crypto/tls. Both clients and servers may send large TLS handshake records which cause servers and clients, respectively, to panic when attempting to construct responses. This affects all TLS 1.3 clients, TLS 1.2 clients which explicitly enable session resumption (by setting Config.ClientSessionCache to a non-nil value), and TLS 1.3 servers which request client certificates (by setting Config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert). |
| The various Is methods (IsPrivate, IsLoopback, etc) did not work as expected for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, returning false for addresses which would return true in their traditional IPv4 forms. |
| A malicious HTTP sender can use chunk extensions to cause a receiver reading from a request or response body to read many more bytes from the network than are in the body. A malicious HTTP client can further exploit this to cause a server to automatically read a large amount of data (up to about 1GiB) when a handler fails to read the entire body of a request. Chunk extensions are a little-used HTTP feature which permit including additional metadata in a request or response body sent using the chunked encoding. The net/http chunked encoding reader discards this metadata. A sender can exploit this by inserting a large metadata segment with each byte transferred. The chunk reader now produces an error if the ratio of real body to encoded bytes grows too small. |
| A malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit (MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function. |
| QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size. |
| Processing an incomplete post-handshake message for a QUIC connection can cause a panic. |
| Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `SniHandler` can allocate up to 16MB of heap for each channel during the TLS handshake. When the handler or the channel does not have an idle timeout, it can be used to make a TCP server using the `SniHandler` to allocate 16MB of heap. The `SniHandler` class is a handler that waits for the TLS handshake to configure a `SslHandler` according to the indicated server name by the `ClientHello` record. For this matter it allocates a `ByteBuf` using the value defined in the `ClientHello` record. Normally the value of the packet should be smaller than the handshake packet but there are not checks done here and the way the code is written, it is possible to craft a packet that makes the `SslClientHelloHandler`. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 4.1.94.Final. |
| Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. With fix, the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes is restricted to <= 8192 bits. Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable. |
| The HTTP/1 client does not fully validate the contents of the Host header. A maliciously crafted Host header can inject additional headers or entire requests. With fix, the HTTP/1 client now refuses to send requests containing an invalid Request.Host or Request.URL.Host value. |
