| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Concierge::Sessions versions from 0.8.1 before 0.8.5 for Perl generate insecure session ids. The generate_session_id function in Concierge::Sessions::Base defaults to using the uuidgen command to generate a UUID, with a fallback to using Perl's built-in rand function. Neither of these methods are secure, and attackers are able to guess session_ids that can grant them access to systems. Specifically,
* There is no warning when uuidgen fails. The software can be quietly using the fallback rand() function with no warnings if the command fails for any reason.
* The uuidgen command will generate a time-based UUID if the system does not have a high-quality random number source, because the call does not explicitly specify the --random option. Note that the system time is shared in HTTP responses.
* UUIDs are identifiers whose mere possession grants access, as per RFC 9562.
* The output of the built-in rand() function is predictable and unsuitable for security applications. |
| Apache::API::Password versions through v0.5.2 for Perl can generate insecure random values for salts.
The _make_salt and _make_salt_bcrypt methods will attept to load Crypt::URandom and then Bytes::Random::Secure to generate random bytes for the salt. If those modules are unavailable, it will simply return 16 bytes generated with Perl's built-in rand function.
The rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic use.
These salts are used for password hashing. |
| HTTP::Session2 versions before 1.12 for Perl for Perl may generate weak session ids using the rand() function.
The HTTP::Session2 session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand() function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
HTTP::Session2 after version 1.02 will attempt to use the /dev/urandom device to generate a session id, but if the device is unavailable (for example, under Windows), then it will revert to the insecure method described above. |
| coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Versions 4.6.2r5 through 4.7.0-r4 have a bad random number generator for nonces and port randomization after refactoring. Additionally, random numbers aren't generated with openssl's RAND_bytes but libc's random() (if it's not running on Windows). When fetching about 50 sequential nonces (i.e., through sending 50 unauthenticated allocations requests) it is possible to completely reconstruct the current state of the random number generator, thereby predicting the next nonce. This allows authentication while spoofing IPs. An attacker can send authenticated messages without ever receiving the responses, including the nonce (requires knowledge of the credentials, which is e.g., often the case in IoT settings). Since the port randomization is deterministic given the pseudorandom seed, an attacker can exactly reconstruct the ports and, hence predict the randomization of the ports. If an attacker allocates a relay port, they know the current port, and they are able to predict the next relay port (at least if it is not used before). Commit 11fc465f4bba70bb0ad8aae17d6c4a63a29917d9 contains a fix. |
| Guzzle OAuth Subscriber signs Guzzle requests using OAuth 1.0. Prior to 0.8.1, Nonce generation does not use sufficient entropy nor a cryptographically secure pseudorandom source. This can leave servers vulnerable to replay attacks when TLS is not used. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.1. |
| DBIx::Class::EncodedColumn use the rand() function, which is not cryptographically secure to salt password hashes.
This vulnerability is associated with program files Crypt/Eksblowfish/Bcrypt.pm.
This issue affects DBIx::Class::EncodedColumn until 0.00032. |
| Vision UI is a collection of enterprise-grade, dependency-free modules for modern web projects. In versions 1.4.0 and below, the getSecureRandomInt function in security-kit versions prior to 3.5.0 (packaged in Vision-ui <= 1.4.0) contains a critical cryptographic weakness. Due to a silent 32-bit integer overflow in its internal masking logic, the function fails to produce a uniform distribution of random numbers when the requested range between min and max is larger than 2³². The root cause is the use of a 32-bit bitwise left-shift operation (<<) to generate a bitmask for the rejection sampling algorithm. This causes the mask to be incorrect for any range requiring 32 or more bits of entropy. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.0. |
| Use of a weak pseudo-random number generator, which may allow an attacker to read or inject encrypted PowerG packets. |
| Crypt::CBC versions between 1.21 and 3.05 for Perl may use the rand() function as the default source of entropy, which is not cryptographically secure, for cryptographic functions.
This issue affects operating systems where "/dev/urandom'" is unavailable. In that case, Crypt::CBC will fallback to use the insecure rand() function. |
| Apache::AuthAny::Cookie v0.201 or earlier for Perl generates session ids insecurely.
Session ids are generated using an MD5 hash of the epoch time and a call to the built-in rand function. The epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems. |
| Crypt::Salt for Perl version 0.01 uses insecure rand() function when generating salts for cryptographic purposes. |
| Data::Entropy for Perl 0.007 and earlier use the rand() function as the default source of entropy, which is not cryptographically secure, for cryptographic functions. |
| The Net::EasyTCP package before 0.15 for Perl always uses Perl's builtin rand(), which is not a strong random number generator, for cryptographic keys. |
| Mojolicious::Plugin::CaptchaPNG version 1.05 for Perl uses a weak random number source for generating the captcha.
That version uses the built-in rand() function for generating the captcha text as well as image noise, which is insecure. |
| Catalyst::Plugin::Session before version 0.44 for Perl generates session ids insecurely.
The session id is generated from a (usually SHA-1) hash of a simple counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID and the current Catalyst context. This information is of low entropy. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems. |
| Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions 2.04 through 2.1800 for Perl generates the cnonce insecurely.
The cnonce (client nonce) is generated from an MD5 hash of the PID, the epoch time and the built-in rand function. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
According to RFC 2831, The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, and to provide mutual authentication. The security of the implementation
depends on a good choice. It is RECOMMENDED that it contain at least 64 bits of entropy. |
| Generation of weak and predictable Initialization Vector (IV) in PMFW (Power Management Firmware) may allow an attacker with privileges to reuse IV values to reverse-engineer debug data, potentially resulting in information disclosure. |
| tgt (aka Linux target framework) before 1.0.93 attempts to achieve entropy by calling rand without srand. The PRNG seed is always 1, and thus the sequence of challenges is always identical. |
| In Net::OAuth::Client in the Net::OAuth package before 0.29 for Perl, the default nonce is a 32-bit integer generated from the built-in rand() function, which is not cryptographically strong. |
| Authen::DigestMD5 versions 0.01 through 0.02 for Perl generate the cnonce insecurely.
The cnonce (client nonce) is generated from an MD5 hash of the PID, the epoch time and the built-in rand function. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage.
According to RFC 2831, "The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, and to provide mutual authentication. The security of the implementation depends on a good choice. It is RECOMMENDED that it contain at least 64 bits of entropy." |
